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223d7dc23d73bdddd7d221d7ddbecafe5d03bfcb
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77 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Peter Steinberger
223d7dc23d feat(gateway)!: require explicit non-loopback control-ui origins 2026-02-24 01:57:11 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
161d9841dc refactor(security): unify dangerous name matching handling 2026-02-24 01:33:08 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
cfa44ea6b4 fix(security): make allowFrom id-only by default with dangerous name opt-in (#24907) 
* fix(channels): default allowFrom to id-only; add dangerous name opt-in

* docs(security): align channel allowFrom docs with id-only default
 2026-02-24 01:01:51 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
663f784e4e test(core): trim redundant setup and tighten waits 2026-02-24 00:31:58 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
f52a0228ca test: optimize auth and audit test runtime 2026-02-23 23:31:52 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
b922ecb8c1 test(security): reduce duplicate audit assertions 2026-02-23 22:16:39 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
57b75678d4 test(security): consolidate runtime guardrail scans 2026-02-22 22:06:01 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
0d0f4c6992 refactor(exec): centralize safe-bin policy checks 2026-02-22 13:18:25 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
c283f87ab0 refactor: clarify strict loopback proxy audit rules 2026-02-22 11:35:08 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
29e41d4c0a fix: land security audit severity + temp-path guard fixes (#23428) (thanks @bmendonca3) 2026-02-22 11:26:17 +01:00
Brian Mendonca
bc78b343ba Security: expand audit checks for mDNS and real-IP fallback 2026-02-22 11:26:17 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
265da4dd2a fix(security): harden gateway command/audit guardrails 2026-02-22 08:45:48 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
049b8b14bc fix(security): flag open-group runtime/fs exposure in audit 2026-02-22 08:22:51 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
fbf0c99d7c test(security): simplify repeated audit finding assertions 2026-02-21 23:09:15 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
0608587bc3 test: streamline config, audit, and qmd coverage 2026-02-21 22:23:43 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
c240104dc3 refactor(test): snapshot gateway auth env in security audit tests 2026-02-21 19:16:21 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
7724abeee0 refactor(test): dedupe env setup across suites 2026-02-21 19:13:46 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
f97c45c5b5 fix(security): warn on Discord name-based allowlists in audit 2026-02-21 19:45:17 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
f48698a50b fix(security): harden sandbox browser network defaults 2026-02-21 14:02:53 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
8c1518f0f3 fix(sandbox): use one-time noVNC observer tokens 2026-02-21 13:56:58 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
1835dec200 fix(security): force sandbox browser hash migration and audit stale labels 2026-02-21 13:25:41 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
14b0d2b816 refactor: harden control-ui auth flow and add insecure-flag audit summary 2026-02-21 13:18:23 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
f76f98b268 chore: fix formatting drift and stabilize cron tool mocks 2026-02-19 15:41:38 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
b40821b068 fix: harden ACP secret handling and exec preflight boundaries 2026-02-19 15:34:20 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
5dc50b8a3f fix(security): harden npm plugin and hook install integrity flow 2026-02-19 15:11:25 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
e3e0ffd801 feat(security): audit gateway HTTP no-auth exposure 2026-02-19 14:25:56 +01:00
habakan
825cc70796 test: dedupe gateway auth and sessions patch coverage (#20087) 2026-02-19 03:35:58 -08:00
Jay Caldwell
9edec67a18 fix(security): block plaintext WebSocket connections to non-loopback addresses (#20803) 
* fix(security): block plaintext WebSocket connections to non-loopback addresses

Addresses CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information).

Previously, ws:// connections to remote hosts were allowed, exposing
both credentials and chat data to network interception. This change
blocks ALL plaintext ws:// connections to non-loopback addresses,
regardless of whether explicit credentials are configured (device
tokens may be loaded dynamically).

Security policy:
- wss:// allowed to any host
- ws:// allowed only to loopback (127.x.x.x, localhost, ::1)
- ws:// to LAN/tailnet/remote hosts now requires TLS

Changes:
- Add isSecureWebSocketUrl() validation in net.ts
- Block insecure connections in GatewayClient.start()
- Block insecure URLs in buildGatewayConnectionDetails()
- Handle malformed URLs gracefully without crashing
- Update tests to use wss:// for non-loopback URLs

Fixes #12519

* fix(test): update gateway-chat mock to preserve net.js exports

Use importOriginal to spread actual module exports and mock only
the functions needed for testing. This ensures isSecureWebSocketUrl
and other exports remain available to the code under test.
 2026-02-19 03:13:08 -08:00
Coy Geek
f7a7a28c56 fix: enforce hooks token separation from gateway auth (#20813) 
* fix(an-03): apply security fix

Generated by staged fix workflow.

* fix(an-03): apply security fix

Generated by staged fix workflow.

* fix(an-03): remove stale test-link artifact from patch

Remove accidental a2ui test-link artifact from the tracked diff and keep startup auth enforcement centralized in startup-auth.ts.
 2026-02-19 02:48:08 -08:00
the sun gif man
114736ed1a Doctor/Security: fix telegram numeric ID + symlink config permission warnings (#19844) 
Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: e42bf1e48de947571007df1d65f25d157a399a84
Co-authored-by: joshp123 <1497361+joshp123@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: joshp123 <1497361+joshp123@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @joshp123
 2026-02-18 00:09:51 -08:00
cpojer
2a4ca7671e chore: Fix types in tests 35/N. 2026-02-17 15:50:07 +09:00
Peter Steinberger
887b209db4 fix(security): harden sandbox docker config validation 2026-02-16 03:04:06 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
92f8c0fac3 perf(test): speed up suites and reduce fs churn 2026-02-15 19:29:27 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
e3b432e481 fix(telegram): require sender ids for allowlist auth 2026-02-14 16:09:00 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
539689a2f2 feat(security): warn when gateway.tools.allow re-enables dangerous HTTP tools 2026-02-14 12:48:02 +01:00
Nick Taylor
1fb52b4d7b feat(gateway): add trusted-proxy auth mode (#15940) 
Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: 279d4b304f83186fda44dfe63a729406a835dafa
Co-authored-by: nickytonline <833231+nickytonline@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: steipete <58493+steipete@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @steipete
 2026-02-14 12:32:17 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
72e9364bac perf(test): speed up hot test files 2026-02-14 02:55:39 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
c2f7b66d22 perf(test): replace module resets with direct spies and runtime seams 2026-02-13 16:04:49 +00:00
Peter Steinberger
f612e35907 fix: add dmScope guidance regression coverage (#13129) (thanks @VintLin) 2026-02-13 16:43:39 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
1def8c5448 fix(security): extend audit hardening checks 2026-02-13 16:26:58 +01:00
Harald Buerbaumer
30b6eccae5 feat(gateway): add auth rate-limiting & brute-force protection (#15035) 
* feat(gateway): add auth rate-limiting & brute-force protection

Add a per-IP sliding-window rate limiter to Gateway authentication
endpoints (HTTP, WebSocket upgrade, and WS message-level auth).

When gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured, failed auth attempts are
tracked per client IP. Once the threshold is exceeded within the
sliding window, further attempts are blocked with HTTP 429 + Retry-After
until the lockout period expires. Loopback addresses are exempt by
default so local CLI sessions are never locked out.

The limiter is only created when explicitly configured (undefined
otherwise), keeping the feature fully opt-in and backward-compatible.

* fix(gateway): isolate auth rate-limit scopes and normalize 429 responses

---------

Co-authored-by: buerbaumer <buerbaumer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
 2026-02-13 15:32:38 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
3421b2ec1e fix: harden hook session key routing defaults 2026-02-13 02:09:14 +01:00
Peter Steinberger
9230a2ae14 fix(browser): require auth on control HTTP and auto-bootstrap token 2026-02-13 02:02:28 +01:00
Gustavo Madeira Santana
e2dea2684f Tests: harden flake hotspots and consolidate provider-auth suites (#11598) 
* Tests: harden flake hotspots and consolidate provider-auth suites

* Tests: restore env vars by deleting missing snapshot values

* Tests: use real newline in memory summary filter case

* Tests(memory): use fake timers for qmd timeout coverage

* Changelog: add tests hardening entry for #11598
 2026-02-07 21:32:23 -05:00
cpojer
328b69be17 chore: Fix audit test on Windows. 2026-02-06 10:22:48 +09:00
Abdel Sy Fane
bc88e58fcf security: add skill/plugin code safety scanner (#9806) 
* security: add skill/plugin code safety scanner module

* security: integrate skill scanner into security audit

* security: add pre-install code safety scan for plugins

* style: fix curly brace lint errors in skill-scanner.ts

* docs: add changelog entry for skill code safety scanner

* style: append ellipsis to truncated evidence strings

* fix(security): harden plugin code safety scanning

* fix: scan skills on install and report code-safety details

* fix: dedupe audit-extra import

* fix(security): make code safety scan failures observable

* fix(test): stabilize smoke + gateway timeouts (#9806) (thanks @abdelsfane)

---------

Co-authored-by: Darshil <ddhameliya@mail.sfsu.edu>
Co-authored-by: Darshil <81693876+dvrshil@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: George Pickett <gpickett00@gmail.com>
 2026-02-05 16:06:11 -08:00
cpojer
f06dd8df06 chore: Enable "experimentalSortImports" in Oxfmt and reformat all imorts. 2026-02-01 10:03:47 +09:00
cpojer
5ceff756e1 chore: Enable "curly" rule to avoid single-statement if confusion/errors. 2026-01-31 16:19:20 +09:00
Peter Steinberger
9a7160786a refactor: rename to openclaw 2026-01-30 03:16:21 +01:00
Vignesh
1d37815443 fix(models): recognize Venice-style claude-opus-45 as claude-opus-4-5 thanks @jonisjongithub 2026-01-27 12:40:06 -08:00