docs(changelog): add windows system.run approval mismatch fix note

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Skills/Security: sanitize skill env overrides to block unsafe runtime injection variables and only allow sensitive keys when declared in skill metadata, with warnings for suspicious values. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
 - Security/Browser: block non-network browser navigation protocols (including `file:`, `data:`, and `javascript:`) while preserving `about:blank`, preventing local file reads via browser tool navigation. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @q1uf3ng for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: block shell startup-file env injection (`BASH_ENV`, `ENV`, `BASH_FUNC_*`, `LD_*`, `DYLD_*`) across config env ingestion, node-host inherited environment sanitization, and macOS exec host runtime to prevent pre-command execution from attacker-controlled environment variables. Thanks @tdjackey.
+- Security/Exec (Windows): canonicalize `cmd.exe /c` command text across validation, approval binding, and audit/event rendering to prevent trailing-argument approval mismatches in `system.run`. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Gateway/Hooks: block `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` traversal in webhook template path resolution to prevent prototype-chain payload data leakage in `messageTemplate` rendering. (#22213) Thanks @SleuthCo.
 - Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent injected inbound user context metadata blocks from leaking into chat history in TUI, webchat, and macOS surfaces by stripping all untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22142) Thanks @Mellowambience, @vincentkoc.
 - Security/OpenClawKit/UI: strip inbound metadata blocks from user messages in TUI rendering while preserving user-authored content. (#22345) Thanks @kansodata, @vincentkoc.