Security/Exec: persist inner commands for shell-wrapper approvals

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/Shell env: validate login-shell executable paths for shell-env fallback (`/etc/shells` + trusted prefixes) and block `SHELL` in dangerous env override policy paths so untrusted shell-path injection falls back safely to `/bin/sh`. Thanks @athuljayaram for reporting.
 - Security/Config: make parsed chat allowlist checks fail closed when `allowFrom` is empty, restoring expected DM/pairing gating.
 - Security/Exec: in non-default setups that manually add `sort` to `tools.exec.safeBins`, block `sort --compress-program` so allowlist-mode safe-bin checks cannot bypass approval. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: when users choose `allow-always` for shell-wrapper commands (for example `/bin/zsh -lc ...`), persist allowlist patterns for the inner executable(s) instead of the wrapper shell binary, preventing accidental broad shell allowlisting in moderate mode. (#23276) Thanks @xrom2863.
 - Security/macOS app beta: enforce path-only `system.run` allowlist matching (drop basename matches like `echo`), migrate legacy basename entries to last resolved paths when available, and harden shell-chain handling to fail closed on unsafe parse/control syntax (including quoted command substitution/backticks). This is an optional allowlist-mode feature; default installs remain deny-by-default. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/SSRF: expand IPv4 fetch guard blocking to include RFC special-use/non-global ranges (including benchmarking, TEST-NET, multicast, and reserved/broadcast blocks), and centralize range checks into a single CIDR policy table to reduce classifier drift.
 - Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.

src/agents/bash-tools.exec-host-gateway.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   minSecurity,
   recordAllowlistUse,
   requiresExecApproval,
+  resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns,
   resolveExecApprovals,
 } from "../infra/exec-approvals.js";
 import { markBackgrounded, tail } from "./bash-process-registry.js";
@@ -153,8 +154,13 @@ export async function processGatewayAllowlist(
       } else if (decision === "allow-always") {
         approvedByAsk = true;
         if (hostSecurity === "allowlist") {
-          for (const segment of allowlistEval.segments) {
-            const pattern = segment.resolution?.resolvedPath ?? "";
+          const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+            segments: allowlistEval.segments,
+            cwd: params.workdir,
+            env: params.env,
+            platform: process.platform,
+          });
+          for (const pattern of patterns) {
             if (pattern) {
               addAllowlistEntry(approvals.file, params.agentId, pattern);
             }

src/infra/exec-approvals-allowlist.ts

@@ -205,6 +205,148 @@ export type ExecAllowlistAnalysis = {
   segmentSatisfiedBy: ExecSegmentSatisfiedBy[];
 };
 
+const SHELL_WRAPPER_EXECUTABLES = new Set([
+  "ash",
+  "bash",
+  "cmd",
+  "cmd.exe",
+  "dash",
+  "fish",
+  "ksh",
+  "powershell",
+  "powershell.exe",
+  "pwsh",
+  "pwsh.exe",
+  "sh",
+  "zsh",
+]);
+
+function normalizeExecutableName(name: string | undefined): string {
+  return (name ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function isShellWrapperSegment(segment: ExecCommandSegment): boolean {
+  const candidates = [
+    normalizeExecutableName(segment.resolution?.executableName),
+    normalizeExecutableName(segment.resolution?.rawExecutable),
+  ];
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    if (!candidate) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (SHELL_WRAPPER_EXECUTABLES.has(candidate)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    const base = candidate.split(/[\\/]/).pop();
+    if (base && SHELL_WRAPPER_EXECUTABLES.has(base)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function extractShellInlineCommand(argv: string[]): string | null {
+  for (let i = 1; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
+    const token = argv[i];
+    if (!token) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const lower = token.toLowerCase();
+    if (lower === "--") {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (
+      lower === "-c" ||
+      lower === "--command" ||
+      lower === "-command" ||
+      lower === "/c" ||
+      lower === "/k"
+    ) {
+      const next = argv[i + 1]?.trim();
+      return next ? next : null;
+    }
+    if (/^-[^-]*c[^-]*$/i.test(token)) {
+      const commandIndex = lower.indexOf("c");
+      const inline = token.slice(commandIndex + 1).trim();
+      if (inline) {
+        return inline;
+      }
+      const next = argv[i + 1]?.trim();
+      return next ? next : null;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function collectAllowAlwaysPatterns(params: {
+  segment: ExecCommandSegment;
+  cwd?: string;
+  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+  platform?: string | null;
+  depth: number;
+  out: Set<string>;
+}) {
+  const candidatePath = resolveAllowlistCandidatePath(params.segment.resolution, params.cwd);
+  if (!candidatePath) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!isShellWrapperSegment(params.segment)) {
+    params.out.add(candidatePath);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (params.depth >= 3) {
+    return;
+  }
+  const inlineCommand = extractShellInlineCommand(params.segment.argv);
+  if (!inlineCommand) {
+    return;
+  }
+  const nested = analyzeShellCommand({
+    command: inlineCommand,
+    cwd: params.cwd,
+    env: params.env,
+    platform: params.platform,
+  });
+  if (!nested.ok) {
+    return;
+  }
+  for (const nestedSegment of nested.segments) {
+    collectAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segment: nestedSegment,
+      cwd: params.cwd,
+      env: params.env,
+      platform: params.platform,
+      depth: params.depth + 1,
+      out: params.out,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive persisted allowlist patterns for an "allow always" decision.
+ * When a command is wrapped in a shell (for example `zsh -lc "<cmd>"`),
+ * persist the inner executable(s) rather than the shell binary.
+ */
+export function resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns(params: {
+  segments: ExecCommandSegment[];
+  cwd?: string;
+  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+  platform?: string | null;
+}): string[] {
+  const patterns = new Set<string>();
+  for (const segment of params.segments) {
+    collectAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segment,
+      cwd: params.cwd,
+      env: params.env,
+      platform: params.platform,
+      depth: 0,
+      out: patterns,
+    });
+  }
+  return Array.from(patterns);
+}
+
 /**
  * Evaluates allowlist for shell commands (including &&, ||, ;) and returns analysis metadata.
  */

src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import {
   normalizeSafeBins,
   requiresExecApproval,
   resolveCommandResolution,
+  resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns,
   resolveExecApprovals,
   resolveExecApprovalsFromFile,
   resolveExecApprovalsPath,
@@ -1214,3 +1215,122 @@ describe("normalizeExecApprovals handles string allowlist entries (#9790)", () =
     }
   });
 });
+
+describe("resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns", () => {
+  function makeExecutable(dir: string, name: string): string {
+    const fileName = process.platform === "win32" ? `${name}.exe` : name;
+    const exe = path.join(dir, fileName);
+    fs.writeFileSync(exe, "");
+    fs.chmodSync(exe, 0o755);
+    return exe;
+  }
+
+  it("returns direct executable paths for non-shell segments", () => {
+    const exe = path.join("/tmp", "openclaw-tool");
+    const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segments: [
+        {
+          raw: exe,
+          argv: [exe],
+          resolution: { rawExecutable: exe, resolvedPath: exe, executableName: "openclaw-tool" },
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+    expect(patterns).toEqual([exe]);
+  });
+
+  it("unwraps shell wrappers and persists the inner executable instead", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const dir = makeTempDir();
+    const whoami = makeExecutable(dir, "whoami");
+    const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segments: [
+        {
+          raw: "/bin/zsh -lc 'whoami'",
+          argv: ["/bin/zsh", "-lc", "whoami"],
+          resolution: {
+            rawExecutable: "/bin/zsh",
+            resolvedPath: "/bin/zsh",
+            executableName: "zsh",
+          },
+        },
+      ],
+      cwd: dir,
+      env: makePathEnv(dir),
+      platform: process.platform,
+    });
+    expect(patterns).toEqual([whoami]);
+    expect(patterns).not.toContain("/bin/zsh");
+  });
+
+  it("extracts all inner binaries from shell chains and deduplicates", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const dir = makeTempDir();
+    const whoami = makeExecutable(dir, "whoami");
+    const ls = makeExecutable(dir, "ls");
+    const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segments: [
+        {
+          raw: "/bin/zsh -lc 'whoami && ls && whoami'",
+          argv: ["/bin/zsh", "-lc", "whoami && ls && whoami"],
+          resolution: {
+            rawExecutable: "/bin/zsh",
+            resolvedPath: "/bin/zsh",
+            executableName: "zsh",
+          },
+        },
+      ],
+      cwd: dir,
+      env: makePathEnv(dir),
+      platform: process.platform,
+    });
+    expect(new Set(patterns)).toEqual(new Set([whoami, ls]));
+  });
+
+  it("does not persist broad shell binaries when no inner command can be derived", () => {
+    const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segments: [
+        {
+          raw: "/bin/zsh -s",
+          argv: ["/bin/zsh", "-s"],
+          resolution: {
+            rawExecutable: "/bin/zsh",
+            resolvedPath: "/bin/zsh",
+            executableName: "zsh",
+          },
+        },
+      ],
+      platform: process.platform,
+    });
+    expect(patterns).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("detects shell wrappers even when unresolved executableName is a full path", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const dir = makeTempDir();
+    const whoami = makeExecutable(dir, "whoami");
+    const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+      segments: [
+        {
+          raw: "/usr/local/bin/zsh -lc whoami",
+          argv: ["/usr/local/bin/zsh", "-lc", "whoami"],
+          resolution: {
+            rawExecutable: "/usr/local/bin/zsh",
+            resolvedPath: undefined,
+            executableName: "/usr/local/bin/zsh",
+          },
+        },
+      ],
+      cwd: dir,
+      env: makePathEnv(dir),
+      platform: process.platform,
+    });
+    expect(patterns).toEqual([whoami]);
+  });
+});

src/node-host/invoke-system-run.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import {
   evaluateShellAllowlist,
   recordAllowlistUse,
   requiresExecApproval,
+  resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns,
   resolveExecApprovals,
   resolveSafeBins,
   type ExecAllowlistEntry,
@@ -314,8 +315,13 @@ export async function handleSystemRunInvoke(opts: {
   }
   if (approvalDecision === "allow-always" && security === "allowlist") {
     if (analysisOk) {
-      for (const segment of segments) {
-        const pattern = segment.resolution?.resolvedPath ?? "";
+      const patterns = resolveAllowAlwaysPatterns({
+        segments,
+        cwd: opts.params.cwd ?? undefined,
+        env,
+        platform: process.platform,
+      });
+      for (const pattern of patterns) {
         if (pattern) {
           addAllowlistEntry(approvals.file, agentId, pattern);
         }