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openclaw/skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py

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fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Regression tests for skill packaging security behavior.
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
2026-02-19 20:32:23 +11:00
"""
import sys
import tempfile
import types
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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import zipfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest import TestCase, main
fake_quick_validate = types.ModuleType("quick_validate")
fake_quick_validate.validate_skill = lambda _path: (True, "Skill is valid!")
sys.modules["quick_validate"] = fake_quick_validate
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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from package_skill import package_skill
class TestPackageSkillSecurity(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.temp_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="test_skill_"))
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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def tearDown(self):
import shutil
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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if self.temp_dir.exists():
shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir)
def create_skill(self, name="test-skill"):
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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skill_dir = self.temp_dir / name
skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(skill_dir / "SKILL.md").write_text("---\nname: test-skill\ndescription: test\n---\n")
(skill_dir / "script.py").write_text("print('ok')\n")
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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return skill_dir
def test_packages_normal_files(self):
skill_dir = self.create_skill("normal-skill")
out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"
out_dir.mkdir()
result = package_skill(str(skill_dir), str(out_dir))
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
skill_file = out_dir / "normal-skill.skill"
self.assertTrue(skill_file.exists())
with zipfile.ZipFile(skill_file, "r") as archive:
names = set(archive.namelist())
self.assertIn("normal-skill/SKILL.md", names)
self.assertIn("normal-skill/script.py", names)
def test_rejects_symlink_to_external_file(self):
skill_dir = self.create_skill("symlink-file-skill")
outside = self.temp_dir / "outside-secret.txt"
outside.write_text("super-secret\n")
link = skill_dir / "loot.txt"
out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"
out_dir.mkdir()
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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try:
link.symlink_to(outside)
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
self.skipTest("symlink unsupported on this platform")
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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result = package_skill(str(skill_dir), str(out_dir))
self.assertIsNone(result)
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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def test_rejects_symlink_directory(self):
skill_dir = self.create_skill("symlink-dir-skill")
outside_dir = self.temp_dir / "outside"
outside_dir.mkdir()
(outside_dir / "secret.txt").write_text("secret\n")
link = skill_dir / "docs"
out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"
out_dir.mkdir()
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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try:
link.symlink_to(outside_dir, target_is_directory=True)
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
self.skipTest("symlink unsupported on this platform")
result = package_skill(str(skill_dir), str(out_dir))
self.assertIsNone(result)
def test_allows_nested_regular_files(self):
skill_dir = self.create_skill("nested-skill")
nested = skill_dir / "lib" / "helpers"
nested.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(nested / "util.py").write_text("def run():\n return 1\n")
out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"
out_dir.mkdir()
result = package_skill(str(skill_dir), str(out_dir))
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
skill_file = out_dir / "nested-skill.skill"
with zipfile.ZipFile(skill_file, "r") as archive:
names = set(archive.namelist())
self.assertIn("nested-skill/lib/helpers/util.py", names)
fix(security): OC-22 prevent Zip Slip and symlink following in skill packaging This commit implements critical security fixes for vulnerability OC-22 (CVSS 7.7, CWE-426) in the skill packaging system. ## Security Fixes 1. Symlink Detection and Rejection - Added check to detect and reject symlinks in skill directories - Prevents attackers from including arbitrary system files via symlink following - Rejects packaging with error message if any symlink is found 2. Path Traversal (Zip Slip) Prevention - Added validation for arcname paths in zip archives - Rejects paths containing ".." (directory traversal) - Rejects absolute paths that could escape skill directory - Prevents attackers from overwriting system files during extraction ## Attack Vectors Mitigated - Symlink following: Attacker creates symlink to /etc/passwd or other sensitive files in skill directory → now rejected - Zip Slip: Attacker crafts paths with "../../root/.bashrc" to overwrite system files during extraction → now rejected ## Changes - Modified: skills/skill-creator/scripts/package_skill.py - Added symlink check (line 73-76) - Added path validation check (line 84-87) - Enhanced error messages for security violations - Added: skills/skill-creator/scripts/test_package_skill.py - Comprehensive test suite with 11 test cases - Tests for symlink rejection - Tests for path traversal prevention - Tests for normal file packaging - Tests for edge cases (nested files, multiple files, large skills) ## Testing All 11 tests pass: - test_normal_file_packaging: Normal files packaged correctly - test_symlink_rejection: Symlinks detected and rejected - test_symlink_to_sensitive_file: Sensitive file symlinks rejected - test_zip_slip_prevention: Normal subdirectories work properly - test_absolute_path_prevention: Path validation logic tested - test_nested_files_allowed: Properly nested files allowed - test_multiple_files_with_symlink_mixed: Single symlink fails entire package - test_large_skill_with_many_files: Large skills handled correctly - test_missing_skill_directory: Error handling verified - test_file_instead_of_directory: Error handling verified - test_missing_skill_md: Error handling verified
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if __name__ == "__main__":
main()